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Chapter 10 
"What W o u l d P e a c e i n V i e t n a m M e a n for Y o u 
as an Investor?" B u s i n e s s E x e c u t i v e s a n d t h e 
A n t i w a r M o v e m e n t , 1 9 6 7 - 7 5 
Eric R. Smith 
On May 21, 1968, while the warring parties in Vietnam held peace talks in 
Paris, twenty-four business executives engaged in a heated exchange with 
Republican Illinois senator Everett Dirksen in his Washington, D.C., office. 
As described by the Chicago Daily News reporter Betty Flynn, the fifteen-
minute meeting began with a plea by the business delegation to a "Republi-
can candidate not persisting in hawkish attitudes" to push for a military 
withdrawal from Vietnam. The delegation misjudged Dirksen's outlook. 
Although he was arguably a press favorite, Dirksen was also critical of con-
gressional doves. Insisting that "whether we like it or not, this is a military 
operation," Dirksen then added, "I can't betray the people back home." One 
of the businessmen retorted, "We are the people back home" before trying to 
explain that "Twenty minutes after we leave Saigon, that government would 
fall apart. We are laying waste to a country without just cause." Dirksen 
snapped: "You don't have the facts.... I know my history. I know my geogra-
phy. We're not going to get anywhere arguing like we do." Recovering his 
composure at the end of the meeting, Dirksen thanked the men for their 
visit.1 
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The delegation could be forgiven for misjudging Dirksen, who had ques-
tioned overall military strategy and as early as 1966 cited war expenditures 
and Great Society programs as inflationary. "Every housewife who shops in 
a grocery store knows this. [Higher prices] are the living, breathing, signs of 
this destructive burglarizing force."2 On the matter of military expenditures, 
the businessmen had arrived at a similar realization and only the year be-
fore their meeting with Dirksen had organized into the Business Executives 
Move for Vietnam Peace and New National Priorities (BEM). The group 
served as a new voice in the growing chorus of opposition to American in-
volvement in Southeast Asia. 
The businessmen involved in the BEM had been shaped by the Second 
World War and Roosevelt's New Deal, and they tended to accept postwar 
liberalism's assumptions, including the continuation of the New Deal with 
Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs.3 These were also men and women 
of privilege whose well-being relied on a healthy economy where American 
consumers could buy their products and services and where monetary poli-
cies ensured low borrowing rates. Moreover, these were parents and citizens 
who could not but be affected by the events of the period. Their collective 
critique of the Vietnam conflict was unified by a concern for what former 
president Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex" and the wis-
dom of the market, which, according to their data, had been negatively 
affected by the war.4 The decade of the sixties was a "drama acted out on 
many stages," and the BEM occupied one of them.5 The men and women of 
the BEM are often recognized in the standard script of the period for their 
role in the Moratorium, when millions of Americans took part in the largest 
political demonstration in American history on October 16,1969.6 Much of 
the BEM's work has remained obscured by the more overt protests of the 
period and what is at present limited archival material, but extant manuscripts 
offer insights into the importance of a segment of the business community's 
involvement in the antiwar movement. As will be made apparent, these busi-
ness executives recognized that their titles and their social status could be used 
to shape the political debate about the war and domestic policies. This essay 
offers a first step toward the inclusion of these significant antiwar activities 
into the future histories of the Vietnam War and is an attempt to account 
for the economic critique that was a chief motivation for these business-
men's activities. Conservative economic attitudes among business leaders of 
this period—at the National Association of Manufacturers, the Business 
Roundtable, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—have been well docu-
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mented, but the history of the BEM suggests another, much less studied, 
aspect of business activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.7 
In early 1968, Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis ran a full page ad in the 
New York Times asking, "What would peace in Vietnam Mean for You as an 
Investor?" At the end of April that year, BEM activists Erwin Salk and John 
Tittle testified before the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, where they 
left, in addition to a prepared statement, a copy of this ad. Salk, the main 
spokesman, was active in founding the BEM, and in his testimony to Con-
gress proceeded to answer the question: "Peace in Vietnam would be the 
most constructive—and the most bullish thing that could happen to the 
stock market." The Paine, Webber analysis concluded that defense demands 
had "stretched the nation's production facilities to the point where there was 
virtually no remaining reserve of economic resources. Result: a substantial 
increase in inflationary pressures." An end to the war, the analysts reported, 
would bring an end to these inflationary pressures as "the threat of demand/ 
pull inflation would subside."8 Even the Wall Street Journal took notice: "On 
the increasingly rare occasions that rumors of Vietnam peace negotiations 
circulate, stock prices go up sharply—and that's about the only time they do 
go up. Whenever the fighting intensified or threatens to intensify, inventory 
sell shares in enough volume to produce a sharp price break."9 However, this 
trend of buying when escalation began and selling on word of peace began 
to fade as "the war also adds to the drain of dollars out of the U.S., which 
both Wall Street and the White House see as reaching crisis proportions. In 
the fourth quarter, the balance-of-payments deficit hit a seasonally adjusted 
$1.8 billion, the worst in any quarter since 1950."10 In short, the material cost 
of the war was becoming increasingly evident, so that even conservatives like 
Phyllis Schlafly questioned the war and its demand for resources that could 
be better utilized elsewhere.11 
The BEM entered into these robust foreign policy discussions when it was 
created in 1966. The origins of the group lay in the protracted correspon-
dence of Chicago-based mortgage broker Erwin "Bud" Salk with Seymour 
Melman of Columbia University, a professor of industrial engineering and 
operations research. Melman was a co-chair of the Committee for a Sane 
Nuclear Policy that opposed the Cold War arms race. His academic work 
focused on analyses of the military-industrial complex—what Melman refers 
to as the "Cold War Institutional Machine"—and the country's commitment 
to Cold War Keynesianism, which he argued helped pull the United States 
into the Vietnam conflict. In his 1965 book Our Depleted Society, Melman 
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described his research as "an economic audit of the price that America has 
paid for twenty years of Cold War." Melman observed how a "process of 
technical, industrial, and human deterioration has been set in motion within 
American society.... The wealthiest nation on earth has been unable to rally 
the resources necessary to raise one fifth of its own people from poverty." 
This was a result, he argued, of "an unprecedented concentration of Ameri-
ca's talent and fresh capital on military production." Melman then proceeded 
to lay out the variety of ways in which these resources were being squandered 
on firms and projects that ultimately siphoned off public revenues but con-
tributed no growth to the economy.12 In his correspondence to Salk, Melman 
connected what he observed to be a "new, viable strategy for the new condi-
tion of the civil rights movement" that emphasized economic opportunity 
with these other underlying assumptions. The "start of a debate on guns vs. 
butter" could now be had, with the result that the "civil rights and the peace 
movements will move in mutually supporting, parallel action."13 
Melman included a prescient observation on the outflow of gold from 
the U.S. economy and its implication for the country's prosperity and world 
standing. By 1949, having become the world's creditor, he found, the United 
States had accumulated a gold stock worth $24.4 billion. By 1964, that reserve 
had been depleted by 35 percent to $15 billion. As Melman recognized, "the 
foreign commitments have been growing and by the middle of 1964 the total 
short-term claims against the United States amounted to $20.5 billion." This 
threatened the value of the American dollar. The debts were the result, Mel-
man observed, of a $3 billion annual cost of foreign military presence (apart 
from the domestic cost of paying for troops and equipment). Indeed, quot-
ing from the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, Melman insisted 
that "American officials have allowed the fear that foreigners might convert 
their dollars into gold to become an all-pervasive stifling influence on United 
States initiative and action on a wide range of domestic and international 
problems."14 This was likely due to the encouragement of capital flow out of 
the United States to places where higher interest rates prevailed, and the out-
flow resulted in trade deficits and increasing pressure on the gold reserves. 
In July 1966, it was Melman who suggested to Salk that a peace organiza-
tion for the business community was necessary. "I think this may be the 
proper time, before it is too late, for responsible men of the business com-
munity to examine the implications of these propositions. It would seem ap-
propriate that we convene an open meeting of business leaders to explore 
the meaning of what is happening."15 Melman's letter to Salk enumerated 
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concerns with respect to Vietnam that would also reflect, if not foreshadow, 
the concerns of the BEM and others in the business community: Vietnam 
expenditures are robbing the domestic economy of resources as well as con-
tributing to inflation; the value of the dollar is dropping internationally, and 
yet the U.S. economy is also ailing in its ability to compete.16 Only a week 
after receiving Melman's letter, Salk sent out a dozens of letters to associates 
around the country trying to interest them in "the convening of a national 
conference of business leaders from industry, banking, trade, etc., to be held 
in Washington, D C , to ponder a number of questions related to [the Viet-
nam war and military expenditures]."17 
Around the time that Salk was posting his letters, Mary Cushing Niles, 
wife of BEM founding member Henry E. Niles (chairman of the Baltimore 
Life Insurance Company), urged Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland to 
speak out against escalation in Vietnam. The senator confided that he was 
constantly being pressured on the war by professionals of every stripe but 
never by businessmen. When she told Henry about the conversation, her 
husband responded with an open letter campaign to the White House that 
culminated on December 28,1966, with 83 signatures.18 The cover letter to 
President Lyndon Johnson read: 
I believe that you sincerely wish to bring the war in Vietnam to a con-
clusion. It is known that you are under pressures from many persons 
who would have you go all out for a military solution by using our 
tremendous military might to crush North Vietnam. I believe that 
such a step—aside from its moral aspects which I believe deeply con-
cern you and many of us—would be unlikely to win the lasting peace 
we want. . . . 
My purpose in getting the signatures to the Open Letter was not to 
add to your heavy burdens but to offset pressure from the 'hawks' and 
to do a little, which I felt I could do, toward building world peace.19 
Niles also stated: "Many companies—possibly all companies—may lose their 
assets, customers and prospects if the war in Vietnam keeps intensifying 
and widening. As Chairman of the Board of the Baltimore Life Insurance 
Company, I believe that I have a major responsibility to do what I can to 
prevent such losses."20 On May 28, 1967, another full-page ad appeared in 
the New York Times, this one an open letter to President Johnson with 300 
signatures. More imploring than the earlier open letter, this one nonetheless 
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urged the president to "stop the bombing, de-escalate military activity in 
South Vietnam, negotiate with all parties which are now fighting."21 Given 
that this letter precedes the Tet Offensive, which had a galvanizing effect 
on the antiwar position the following year, Johnson should not have been 
surprised by early 1968 when his own inner circle, responding to many of 
these same concerns, turned against the war. 
The two efforts by Niles and Salk brought the two organizers and their 
supporters together. A year later, the name of the proposed group was the 
"National Committee of Business Executives for Peace" (though "for End-
ing the War" was also recommended). Besides Bud Salk and Henry Niles, the 
other BEM founders included Harold Willens, a Los Angeles business exec-
utive; and William Fischer, president of Fischer Machine Company in Phila-
delphia. Other executives of various profiles would eventually be active in or 
supportive of the organization, including Charles Simpson, general manager 
for Philadelphia Gas Works; and Lee B. Thomas, Jr., president of Vermont 
American Corporation. Both would sit on the executive board. The first co-
chairmen of the organization in 1967 were Niles and Willens. Later, Fischer, 
Salk, Simpson, Thomas, and Joseph E. McDowell, president of Servomation 
Corporation in New York, would sit on the executive committee. President 
Eisenhower's head of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Sinclair 
Armstrong, and Robert Roosa, former undersecretary of the Treasury, were 
also among the Washington insiders with BEM membership. 
Several of the local affiliates have left behind a documentary record 
offering insights into the organization's work and its constituents. The St. Louis 
local was founded by Thomas Hardy, the owner of the Hardy Salt Company, 
who was later the chairman of the BEM. His committee included dozens of 
executives from banking, finance, and manufacturing. For an example of the 
constituents of the BEM, consider this sampling of the active membership 
of the St. Louis committee:22 
Marvin L. Madeson, ITT Aetna Finance Co. 
Wm. Stix Friedman, Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. 
Leo A. Drey, Pioneer Forest 
Wilber E. Eckstein, American Commission Paper Co. 
Victor H. Gavel, Gaywood Manufacturing Co. 
Larry R. Gavel, Gaywood Manufacturing Co. 
George T Guernsey, III, Manchester Bank 
Harold Hartogensis, George Johnson, Advertising 
\pf 
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George Johnson, George Johnson, Advertising 
Marvin L. Madeson, IIT Aetna Finance Co. 
Lionel Kalish, Jr., Elder Manufacturing Co. 
Bernard Kornblum, St. Louis Music Supply Co. 
Robert Rudright, Rudright Organization 
Richard T. Stith, Fette-Stith Agency 
J. A. Zimmerman, Cahokia Flour Company 
A similar cross-section of the business community could be found in the or-
ganization in Chicago. The national BEM also lined up nearly a dozen mili-
tary officers and diplomats as sponsors, including Brig. General William 
Wallace Ford, Brig. General Samuel B. Griffith, Brig. General Robert L. 
Hughes, Rear Admiral Robert C. Huston, General David M. Shoup, General 
William B. McKean, and Rear Admiral Arnold E. True. Kennedy confidant 
John Kenneth Galbraith also was active in the group and gave several lec-
tures on its behalf.23 A group called Corporate Executives Committee for 
Peace that eventually merged with the BEM to become the New York branch 
of the organization had seven Revlon executives on its steering committee. At 
a June 1970 event for that organization, the speakers included John Kerry, the 
future senator and secretary of State; a Twentieth Century Fox executive, Hal 
Davis; as well as Attorney General Ramsey Clark; Democratic Senator Alan 
Cranston of California; and Harold Willens of the BEM.24 
The primary figures in the BEM were also often active on several fronts, 
and antiwar activism served as an extension of their other activities. Salk's 
congressional testimony suggested that it was a matter of self-interest for the 
business community, but some background on the men suggests that a 
deeper commitment also existed. For example, Salk was active on civil rights 
issues long before he became active on the war. As president of the forty-
second largest mortgage firm in the United States, Salk criticized real estate 
redlining and housing restrictions and underwrote hundreds of social jus-
tice causes. Like many of the business executives in the 1960s who were in-
volved in the BEM, he was also a veteran of the Second World War. Salk 
propelled himself into the public eye with statements in the press, both 
locally in Chicago, and later nationally, about racist real estate contracts and 
housing codes. He attacked both as anticapitalist. Salk was aware of the his-
tory in the South of black mutual aid societies developing insurance compa-
nies and the long history of business apartheid that accompanied 
segregation.25 Salk's colleague, Henry Niles, held religious convictions as a 
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Quaker that compelled his antiwar activities. Niles had connections to the 
New Left and radical activism through his daughter Alice's marriage to 
Staughton Lynd, the radical historian whose firing from several universities 
over his political activities spawned some of the many outcries of the period.26 
Niles would later criticize Nixon, the Quaker president, by telling a House 
subcommittee that "We feel that we are getting from the military diminish-
ing security at escalating cost. . . . Heavy military spending, started under 
past administrations but continuing high throughout the Nixon adminis-
tration has been and now is the major cause of inflation. The production of 
military hardware, although it generates payrolls, makes no additions to the 
supply of consumer goods and services available."27 The activities of Thomas 
Hardy's family also suggest the ways in which personal commitments play 
out on the political stage. His wife, Jane, was active in the League of Women 
Voters and would be an outspoken advocate for the empowerment of the 
United Nations' International Criminal Court. The Los Angeles chapter of 
the BEM was headed by A. R. Appleby, who regularly attended stockholder 
meetings and asked discomfiting questions about the company's ties to 
Southeast Asian military operations. Harold Willens, president of the Los 
Angeles-based Factory Equipment Supply Company, eventually devoted 
himself to full-time activism first with the BEM and later with the nuclear 
freeze movement. Like Erwin Salk, he had served in the Pacific during the 
Second World War. The left-wing magazine the Nation now sponsors a 
Nation Institute that endows an award in Willens's honor, the Harold Wil-
lens Peace Fellowship. 
It was Willens who was instrumental in pulling the founding meeting 
together in September 1967 at the Statler-Hilton in Washington, D C , which 
featured a keynote address from Marriner Eccles, the Utah banker whom 
President Roosevelt had once appointed chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board. Eccles had also been involved that year in forming with former John 
Kennedy advisors John Kenneth Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger the group 
Negotiations Now, which intended to sway policy away from the singular 
pursuit of military victory.28 Marriner Eccles's address at the founding is in-
structive of the BEM's core principles and what worried the Johnson and 
then Nixon administrations. He began with a rejection of the Cold War con-
sensus and the belief in a monolithic expansionist communism that was di-
rectly at odds with the war's conservative supporters.29 While communism 
had been advancing, the Soviet Union's control over it had been waning, he 
argued. "We see every rebellion as the result of a deep plot out of Moscow or 
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Peking, when it usually is the result of crushing poverty, hunger and intoler-
able living conditions." In a frank statement of moral equivalency, Eccles 
wondered what the United States would do if Russia were daily bombing an 
American ally. "It is inconceivable that we would limit ourselves to provid-
ing only military equipment, as they are doing." At the core of the argument 
was a material concern: "This war is directly causing a substantial increase 
in the deficiency in our international balance of payments, which is already 
serious." He then lamented the neglect of the initiatives of Johnson's Great 
Society. In a bracketed reference at the end of his address, Eccles credits the 
British historian Arnold Toynbee and the radical historian Howard Zinn 
(who went on to write A People's History of the United States) "for the assis-
tance I received from reading their excellent articles."30 The parenthetical 
acknowledgment underscores Niles's earlier admission that the business 
community was in a sense responding to the antiwar movement already 
under way and taking that political struggle to the corridors of power in ways 
that the New Left could not. Unlike the New Left, where the dialogue was 
predominantly in the streets and on campus, the BEM was bringing that 
dialogue to Congress and two successive presidents, albeit with a variation 
on that antiwar message. 
It would not be until January that the group finally opened its Washing-
ton office under the direction of Robert Maslow, who was formerly employed 
by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The D C office's activities 
were devoted almost solely to lobbying but also included a two-month speak-
ing tour by Don Luce, the former head of International Voluntary Services 
in Vietnam. In contrast to other antiwar organizations, the BEM was able 
to regularly land high-profile meetings with government officials. According 
to Harold Willens, the initial press coverage of the group was entirely by his 
own efforts: "That fantastic coverage BEM got through my lengthy inter-
views on prime time NBC and CBS news shows was not arranged by anyone 
else. Only by me. I called and got to the right people and 'sold' them on the 
merit of our story."31 The meetings with officials would seem to have resulted 
through the same type of effort and networking. In March 1969, a delegation 
met with Senator Tydings and also Charles Schultz, the former director of 
the budget. That same month a meeting was held with Jonathan Moore, spe-
cial assistant to the undersecretary of state. And in April, the delegation 
landed a meeting with Henry Kissinger's special assistant, Dean Moor. Then 
in June, the group's J. Sinclair Armstrong testified before the Defense Sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee. According to the 
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organization's files, Henry Niles also "made off-the-record contacts with 
former very high government officials." In May, the organization hosted 
an "emergency meeting" that included speeches by Senators John Cooper, 
William Fulbright, and Ralph Yarborough along with several other represen-
tatives. By July, the organization had 2,531 members.32 By the next year, these 
members included Robert T. Bernstein, president, and Bennett Cerf, chair-
man of the board, of Random House; Roger Sonnabend, chairman of the 
board of Sonesta International Hotels; George Weissman, president of Philip 
Morris; Max Palevsky, chairman of Xerox; and Lawrence Phillips, presi-
dent of Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation. Membership would top out at 
11,000 by the end of 1970, and this growing network alarmed President 
Nixon, who added the organization to his "Enemies List."33 
The group became very active, especially its speakers bureau. It actively 
undertook lobbying activities, coordinated meetings with other groups, 
funded political campaigns, held luncheons and fund raisers, published 
a newsletter, underwrote visible public relations campaigns, issued press 
releases that frequently made it into print, and bought radio spots. Organiz-
ing occurred in more than a dozen cities: Chicago, New York, Detroit, Cleve-
land, Los Angeles, Kansas City, Portland, Oregon; Boston, San Francisco, 
St. Louis, Baltimore, Seattle, Louisville, and eventually in Milwaukee, At-
lanta, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, with chapters also in Indiana, Iowa, Maine, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Nebraska, and Tennessee.34 
By 1968, the goals of the BEM became more focused to emphasize the 
group's nonpartisanship and followed to the letter the 1967 New York Times 
full-page ad with the additional demands to "negotiate with all parties, in-
cluding the National Liberation Front" and "Support the general principles 
of the Geneva agreements of 1954."35 Henry Niles contextualized these goals 
in the starkest business terms: 
Each individual and each business should do its part toward build-
ing a secure and peaceful world. The life insurance business has a 
particularly strong interest in and obligation toward world security 
for the following reasons: 1) Even a small war could affect our mor-
tality experience from losses due to direct casualties (which are cov-
ered by practically all life insurance contracts now in force) and losses 
due to the effect of atomic fallout. 2) Huge military expenditures may 
lead to inflation which will decrease the value of dollars in which we 
pay our policyholders or their beneficiaries. Too much inflation 
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would be ruinous to our business. 3) A war which involved action 
against this country would probably cause great losses in our invest-
ment portfolios.36 
The BEM's activists pushed this line at its various events and through letter 
writing campaigns, petitions, and congressional lobbying, and in their news-
paper and radio ads. In 1970, the BEM also helped finance the Citizens 
Commission of Inquiry into atrocities in Vietnam. Early that year, the BEM 
had finally been able to reach out to a separate group of Wall Street activists 
and forge an alliance with the Corporate Executive Committee for Peace, 350 
businessmen who had also made inroads in official Washington.37 
Despite the wealth of its membership, BEM suffered financial and inter-
necine setbacks. The group experienced infighting, as the Los Angeles chapter's 
leader pushed for a Daniel Ellsberg support fund, which he played up in the 
media and gave the impression of the backing of the national organization, 
whose members forced his resignation. The St. Louis office under Hardy's 
leadership set up a separate Ellsberg Defense Fund that was distinguished 
from the BEM and managed to raise several thousand dollars. A Pentagon 
Papers Defense Fund was also planned in St. Louis.38 Even though formal 
membership was rising, a lack of funds necessitated closing the BEM's Wash-
ington office. The office was reopened in 1971. The St. Louis and Chicago 
offices, for which there is good accounting data, both reveal very modest 
campaigns. St. Louis was only spending close to $1,000-2,000 per month and 
bringing in barely enough to support its expenditures. A great many of 
BEM's initial supporters were also not keeping up with their dues, even 
though they remained on the membership lists and continued receiving the 
group's monthly newsletter as free riders. In late 1970, Henry Niles wrote to 
the National Council members that "it was obvious that we have been 
under-staffed and under-financed for many months, especially during the 
months of the political campaign when potential contributors were giving 
heavily to candidates of their choice." A national meeting just held in San 
Francisco was attended below the quorum of 50 percent of the members.39 
Still, business executives had access to resources that brought peace ad-
vocacy to the establishment. A series of full-page ads in the Washington Post 
and New York Times provoking questions about the conflict was difficult to 
ignore. "How to Make a Killing in the Market," read one header; "That 
Effete Corps of Impudent Snobs Is About to Do It Again," read another. 
Creative summaries of the group's official position followed below the 
208 Eric R. Smith 
banners. The group also co-sponsored with New National Priorities what 
was called "Operation Housecleaning."40 In two election cycles, the BEM 
targeted a group of hawks in Congress, defeating three in each election. The 
1970 campaign derived from Progressive magazine's "Nixon's Silent House of 
Hawks," prepared by Garrison Nelson. By the group's own admission, the 1970 
effort was poorly coordinated, but the Washington, D C , office of the BEM 
expressed satisfaction with its victories that year. In the second cycle, the group 
endorsed George McGovern and pledged $50,000 to defeat the "deadly dozen" 
hawks in Congress. "The Deadly Dozen are not necessarily the most pro-
war Congressmen. To be selected each must have a definitely pro-war vot-
ing record and each must be facing an opponent who is anti-war and who, we 
believe, is strong enough to make the incumbent vulnerable."41 The 1972 
effort was more concerted but with the same results—three victories—so 
that over the course of two election cycles, the group had defeated six of its 
fifteen political targets.42 Among the congressmen the group backed were 
Pete McCloskey (California), Eugene Gallegos (New Mexico), and Roger 
Boas (California). The BEM expenses for 1972 came to $30,660 in direct ex-
penditures to candidates.43 
The 1970 campaign also brought the executives a new political challenge 
that mustered the organization's resources in a political battle that has had 
long-lasting repercussions. As a result of its deep pockets, the group com-
missioned a series of sixty-second radio spots and attempted to purchase 
time to air them. A Washington, D.C., station, WTOP, refused to air the 
messages, at which point the BEM filed a "Fairness Doctrine" complaint with 
the Federal Communications Commission. The outcome on August 5,1970, 
ruled that the radio station could legitimately refuse to sell one-minute seg-
ments of its "commercial" spot-announcement time, even though WTOP 
had previously sold spot announcements to political candidates during 
election campaigns, because, the commission maintained, BEM's concerns 
necessitated "more in-depth analysis than can be provided in a 10,20, 30, or 
60 second announcement."44 
The organization also utilized political theater to make its point. John 
H. Whitaker, who chaired the Kansas City branch of the organization and 
owned a local cable company, hatched a plan to meet with executives at the 
Honeywell Corporation at their headquarters in Minneapolis. Whitaker 
wrote to Honeywell board chairman James Binger in February 1972, with the 
observation that Honeywell had begun to realize an increase in its computer 
business while it had decreases of 24 percent in its defense branch. Whitaker 
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was concerned, "Since the Pentagon frequently asserts that it is attacking 
only 'military targets' in Vietnam I found it important to know the defini-
tion of a military target as stated in the Air Force manual [citing US Air 
Force ROTC manual of May 1961]." However, he discovered that: 
[M]ost of the victims of anti-personnel bombs are not killed rather 
they are maimed... . Products made by your company are destroy-
ing in a massive, indiscriminate, and impersonal way the entire so-
cial fabric of part of the world. In 1965, the Catholic Church declared 
in the Document of Vatican II: "Any act of war aimed indiscrimi-
nately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along 
with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It 
merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation." (Pastoral Con-
stitution on the Church in the Modern World, n. 80.) I am sure you 
and your company do not bear this responsibility lightly.... As the 
executive responsible for computer system development and related 
hardware purchases, I would not consider Honeywell computers 
until the manufacture and distribution of this inhumane weap-
onry is ceased. I am going to encourage your Users Group to adopt a 
similar position by making them aware of the diversity of your 
interests.45 
This letter earned him an interview at Binger's Minneapolis office. 
Whitaker brought with him several other people: Dick Fernandez, Richard 
Falk, and Fred Branfman. Fernandez was involved in Clergy and Laymen 
Concerned about Vietnam (CALCAV), which had in 1970 been involved in 
the planning of the Winter Soldier Investigation. Falk was a Princeton Uni-
versity professor of international relations who was already well known at 
that time. His recent work is perhaps also relevant—beginning in 2005, he 
chaired the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, a direction that the 
BEM would take in the 1980s, when Bud Salk attempted to reactivate the or-
ganization. Branfman would not necessarily have been known by Binger at 
the time but is best known now as an antiwar activist who lived in Laos and 
was responsible for exposing the secret air war there.46 The resulting press 
reports of the meeting were devastating for Honeywell. Whitaker claimed in 
correspondence to Binger after the press treatment that it had not been his 
intention to invite the one-sided response the meeting attained, though it is 
difficult to imagine how such a campaign and invited press attention could 
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not have gone otherwise. Binger and Honeywell were driven to damage con-
trol, which resulted in a convoluted press release that, rather than point out 
that Whitaker and his colleagues had been mistaken about Honeywell's pres-
ent defense production (which apparently they had been), instead offered a 
terse and flat justification for its military production capacity: 
We cannot agree with this reasoning. So long as a military or defense 
establishment of some sort is needed, and most Americans agree that 
one is needed, the ultimate decision as to types and quantities of 
weapons to be available and used must be the responsibility of the 
Department of Defense, monitored by the national administration 
and Congress as representatives of all the people. 
It is essential for the survival of our democracy that corporations 
carry out public policies declared by elected representatives of the 
people.... 
Honeywell has been on record for a number of years as wanting 
the war ended as quickly as possible. Honeywell people share the 
same human feelings and respect for life that our critics claim as their 
justification. 
Another idea expressed that we feel needs comment is that the 
war is somehow good for Honeywell's business. From any standpoint 
we would prefer to conduct business in a world of peace. War is waste-
ful. It uses tax dollars that could be better utilized to strengthen the 
economy and meet the needs of our society. 
It is apparent that the current wave of protest has as its principal 
emotional appeal the idea that certain weapons are more horrible 
than others and that those who make them are war criminals. 
There are no nice weapons. It is one of the tragedies of humanity 
that weapons exist at all, but the stern lesson of history is that those 
who cherish freedom must be prepared to fight for freedom. 
Anti-personnel weapons of the type most frequently criticized 
have the same purpose as hand grenades, conventional bombs or bul-
lets. They were not developed for use against civilian population as 
has been charged.... 
We flatly reject the charge that manufacturing these weapons 
makes Honeywell people war criminals. This is a slanderous charge 
that is utterly devoid of merit.47 
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If Whitaker was not a pacifist, one might get the impression by his actions 
that he was. 
While the motivations among the members may have varied, and the 
group's campaigns were equally diverse, the end results of the group's efforts 
are best understood in the context of business as usual, which echoed the 
Paine, Webber assessment and others discussed so far. Two months after 
the founding of the BEM, Bud Salk's November 9 speech in Chicago was 
introduced into the Congressional Record by Representative Robert W. Kas-
tenmeier, a Wisconsin Democrat. As he had on the previous occasion before 
the chamber, Salk began from the claim that "the massive spending for the 
Vietnam war has been the most significant and unsettling economic factor 
in determining the priorities of the Federal Budget, and has been the central 
force in the destabilization and distortion of the American economy.... 
Allocations of American resources for the design, manufacture and the op-
eration of armaments have risen 60 percent in just over two years, and 
have brought the military budget to a level where it represents the largest 
single sector of the American economy."48 From Salk's standpoint as a 
mortgage banker, this meant that "aside from the virtual depletion of great 
society programs," the capital market was bearing the brunt of the financing 
of the war, resulting in a "capital shortage of severe proportions and the 
highest interest rates since the aftermath of World War I." As he proceeded 
to explain, the net result was private competition with the government for 
investment funds, so that in 1966 there was a "12 percent decline in physical 
volume of construction, even though the needs for virtually every kind of 
residential, commercial, industrial and public construction increased rap-
idly." Investors were finding entirely too many opportunities in the bond 
market to want to invest elsewhere. For Salk, priorities were inverted: "reli-
able estimates have pointed up that it would only take somewhere between 
$90 and $120 billion to eradicate all slums and provide decent housing in 
their place." Invoking Kennedy's and later Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, line 
on inevitable revolutions, Salk closed by saying: "By ignoring the national 
priorities at home . . . we plant the very seeds of destruction and revolution 
that we feel so dedicated to fighting abroad."49 
These concerns were echoed by Louis B. Lundborg, chairman of the 
world's largest bank, Bank of America, who testified before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee in April 1970 on "Why Peace Would Be Good for 
Business." He was not officially affiliated with the BEM, but based on a 
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report by his bank's Economic Department, which reads much like the 
Paine, Webber analysis, he told the Senate: "[The war in Vietnam] draws 
off resources that could be put to work towards solving imperative problems 
facing this nation at home. And despite the protestations of the new left to 
the contrary, the fact is that an end to the war would be good, not bad, for 
American business." In his analysis, Lundborg explained that "When we 
survey the very real needs in our economy in the areas of housing, urban 
transit, environmental pollution, etc., it is clearly evident that we do not need 
to create war-related demand for resources in order to maintain full employ-
ment." He offered figures: prior to the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, defense 
spending averaged $50 billion per year. Assuming this would have remained 
the case, the increase of $118 billion per year was slightly above the annual 
$112 billion in spending for residential construction. He also insisted that 
even if the conflict in Vietnam had been profitable for the country, he 
"would not support our role in the war."50 War spending had been infla-
tionary since 1965, he concluded, when expenditures for the conflict began 
to amplify the effects of near full employment. 
Besides the board room of Bank of America, other executives also ex-
pressed concern. The director of IBM, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., stated that "If 
we continue, I believe we will soon reach a point where much of the damage 
will be irreparable." And New York's governor Nelson Rockefeller would call 
for a hasty conclusion to the conflict in order to avoid "greater disasters in 
the future."51 This came at the very moment that the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee rescinded the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by an 81-10 margin and 
declared that Nixon was in violation of the Constitution.52 
In short, aside from the growth of the military-industrial complex, a 
cross-section of the American business community opposed to the war had 
concerns about inflation, about the neglect of the War on Poverty in order to 
fund the war, and about Nixon's plan for a 10 percent increase in the income 
tax. They were not alone in their concerns: President Nixon and economists 
in his inner circle also observed the effects of the Vietnam War inflation on 
the trade deficit, as well as other related factors, according to a report by the 
Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy.53 Throughout 
the 1960s, U.S. companies were moving funds abroad to avoid taxation, and 
depositors were moving funds overseas to find higher rates of return, because 
the Federal Reserve had imposed a ceiling on interest rates for depositors. 
There were other moves abroad, like gambling on exchange rates and financ-
ing takeovers, that drained the United States of currency. As the Bretton 
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Woods system required dollars be backed by gold, foreign countries started 
demanding American gold reserves as the dollar began to lose its value. By 
1971, the United States had depleted one-third of its gold reserves, so Nixon 
decided to stop selling it. The American government in its ongoing expenses 
for the war was, therefore, also driving inflationary pressures in the bond 
market, which had ripple effects throughout the economy.54 
The January 1968 Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis analysis discussed at 
the outset of this chapter bemoaned that "the escalation of the Vietnam con-
flict to its present level has created an enormous increase in defense de-
mand" and that "this has been superimposed upon demand from both the 
private and public sectors of the economy, which—already—had stretched 
the nation's production facilities to the point where there was virtually no 
remaining reserve of economic resources." The report went on to suggest that 
"Funds needed for the war in Vietnam could be rechanneled to the war on 
poverty. Education, highways, housing—all would come in for higher gov-
ernment appropriations as a result of the end of the war in Vietnam.. . . 
A substantial reduction in total government spending seems doubtful." It 
then noted that the United States had developed a sizable balance-of-trade 
deficit against Britain that was equal to the "dollar flow from our commit-
ment to Vietnam." An end to the war, then, would reduce this deficit and 
put the country in a better position to achieve a balance of payments.55 From 
a later vantage point, it seems clear that the Vietnam War was not the sole 
cause of the economic problems beginning to confront the United States: 
these business leaders were in fact observing the decline of the Bretton Woods 
system. But at the time, the war seemed to be the primary culprit. Indeed, 
the death knell for the War on Poverty and the budget priorities for 1968 
marked a decisive shift in government interest in a healthy demand side of 
the economy. The New Deal that laid the social foundation for the men of 
the BEM set as priorities social commitments that were evident in Johnson's 
War on Poverty but quite absent from the agenda to fight in Vietnam. The 
use of public funds to stimulate the economy and to assist the impoverished 
was accepted by these activists, and the inability both to fund the war and to 
fund social programs was not lost on them. Sargent Shriver, the Kennedy 
son-in-law who directed the Peace Corps and the War on Poverty, was told 
that his Community Action Program was to be defunded in order to in-
crease the defense budget.56 
The efforts of the BEM may even have played a role that was undoubt-
edly critical in the eventual withdrawal. A recent history of the Tet Offensive 
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suggests that the business community's negative reaction to that event con-
vinced Secretary of Defense (and Wall Street attorney) Clark Clifford of the 
need for an exit strategy.57 In March 1968, President Johnson blamed Clif-
ford for what he saw as poisoning his strategic discussion in his National 
Security team. Johnson's "Wise Men" had turned against the war by early 
1968 because of the pervasive belief, according to Clifford, that "Vietnam was 
weakening us at home and in the rest of the world. And they were right."58 
Clifford's biographer suggests that this conclusion resulted from Clifford's 
intimate awareness of "what members of the business and legal establish-
ment were thinking."59 "These guys who have been with us and who have 
sustained us so far as we are sustained are no longer with us," as Clifford put 
it. "[M]ajor elements of the national constituency—the business community, 
the press, the churches, the professional groups, college presidents, students, 
and most of the intellectual community—have turned against this war."60 
Clifford, like many of these men, also reconsidered his moderate hawkish 
position after the Tet Offensive. Yet business pressure alone hardly brought 
Clifford around, as he would privately confide later to Henry Niles: "We have 
become the barbarians of the world... . I would put no limit at all on what 
Nixon would do."61 
It is even possible that BEM's organizing fostered business organization 
later in the 1970s. Given his contacts in the American business community, 
it seems reasonable to associate Clark Clifford's connections with his 
appointment to the board of Business Roundtable in 1978 as a sector of 
American business began to recognize a need for coordinated lobbying.62 
Representative Paul McCloskey (R-California) told Erwin Salk years later 
that "Many times I have mentioned in a speech that it was really the busi-
ness community that finally brought the tragedy of Vietnam to an end."63 
Henry Niles could report to the BEM membership in mid-1968 that "Re-
sponsible sources in Washington tell us that the growing opposition of the 
business community has been a vital factor in whatever progress toward 
peace there has been since the beginning of the year." It is also noteworthy 
that dissident intellectual Noam Chomsky reasoned at that time that only a 
shift in elite opinion would bring the war to a close, on the assumption that 
elite opinion shapes policy to begin with.64 Moreover, George McGovern 
claimed to Henry Niles in 1972 that the "Business Executives Move for Viet-
nam Peace has played a vital role in the search for an end to our national folly 
in Vietnam. Perhaps the most important contribution has been the breadth 
you have brought to the anti-war effort."65 
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Momentum against the war among the businessmen had been building 
for some time, as Yale political scientists Bruce Russett and Elizabeth Han-
son found when they published Interest and Ideology in 1975. They wanted to 
gauge the interests of American businessmen on U.S. foreign policy and a 
number of domestic issues. Utilizing an earlier study of American elites (in 
the media, organized labor, and business) conducted at Columbia University, 
Russett and Hanson asked the same questions again of a group of business 
vice presidents at Fortune 500 firms and another group of ranking officers at 
the five war colleges. The Yale sample consisted of more than 1,000 business-
men, almost all over the age of 40, and nearly half in their fifties. Nearly 
three-quarters of these men were veterans of the Second World War. Among 
the findings were that 61.5 percent of businessmen believed "trade, technical 
assistance, [and] economic interdependence" were the most important ap-
proach to world peace. This reply garnered six times more responses than 
any other answer. More than 57 percent of businessmen believed that the 
threat of communism abroad had decreased over the previous decade, and 
about the same percentage believed (though some of them with qualifica-
tions) that the United States had contributed to the escalation of the Cold 
War "by overreacting to Soviet moves or military developments." The busi-
ness community was also divided over the cause of poverty being "due to 
cultural and psychological problems of the poor," with nearly 47 percent in 
disagreement and just over 53 percent in agreement. More than 52 percent 
also believed that it had been incorrect to commit ground troops to Viet-
nam, with an overwhelming 77.1 percent agreeing with the claim that the 
Vietnam War had been bad for the economy. And nearly 90 percent be-
lieved that the war had negative consequences for "American social and 
political institutions."66 Coming in 1975, the sentiments could very well 
have represented hindsight, but given the arguments of the membership of 
the BEM nearly a decade before, certainly some of those surveyed had come 
to these conclusions much earlier. 
In the final analysis then, what finally threatened the Cold War endeavor 
of Vietnam was business-as-usual but not necessarily the business of war. 
Congress responded, McCloskey and others suggest, not to democracy 
being in the streets but to businessmen concerned about the American 
economy. The business executives were latecomers to the antiwar move-
ment, though the BEM's founders both had associations and activities pecu-
liar to them that defined their corner of the movement.67 The emergence of a 
business opposition to the conflict brought further pressure to bear on the 
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leaders of the United States' aggression abroad. The antiwar segment of the 
business community saw in the Vietnam War a misallocation of state re-
sources: the cost of borrowing to pay for the war was driving up interests 
rates for American businesses, infrastructure was being built abroad while 
neglected at home, and government support for American business was 
going to those sectors that supported the military rather than to industries 
that would produce profits and long-term growth. In short, the Vietnam War 
was bad for American business. That this outlook and its prescription came 
at a moment when larger structural forces in the global economy shocked the 
industrialized world and were setting the stage for a postwar readjustment 
during the 1970s could not have been foreseen.68 These American business-
men also recognized that war was not necessarily good for the health of the 
state. Indeed, the work of the Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace 
illustrates quite literally that the historical balance sheet of the Vietnam 
War's costs only ran further into the red. 
